Category Archives: Europe

David Cameron and Centrifugal Crises

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British Prime Minister David Cameron made waves in late January when he announced plans to hold a referendum on the U.K.’s continued membership in the European Union. Should the Conservatives win elections in 2015, Cameron promised a simple “in or out” referendum on E.U. membership by 2017.  The move seems to have roots in domestic politics. Cameron faces considerable pressure from the Eurosceptic wing of his own party as well as a challenge from the UK Independence Party, which has been surging along the Conservatives’ political flank.

This all raises the prospect that, absent Conservative defeat or a Europhilic turn on the part of the British public, one of the core members (and key funders) of the E.U. could make an ungraceful exit in the coming years. In the long term, this could prove a greater threat to the viability of the European project than the economic woes of more peripheral members like Greece and Spain.

Labour leader Ed Miliband sharply criticized the proposal and hardened his own opposition to such a step (though support from some of his backbenchers may be shaky). Nick Clegg, whose Liberal Democrats are members of the Conservative governing coalition, dissented sharply as well. Heads of state in Europe did not react warmly to the news, nor to the strong-arm tactics it represents. Former Prime Minister Tony Blair said Cameron’s brinksmanship could backfire: “It reminds me a bit of the Mel Brooks comedy Blazing Saddles where the sheriff says at one point as he holds a gun to his own head: ‘If you don’t do what I want I’ll blow my brains out.’ You want to watch out that one of the 26 [other EU member states] doesn’t just say: ‘OK, go ahead.’”

Extra points for the Mel Brooks reference, and for having the good sense not to repeat the quote verbatim.

Cameron’s move seems risky, but makes sense in light of both domestic and international factors. In addition to shoring up cracks in his governing coalition, his announcement seems designed to increase his leverage in upcoming negotiations over the E.U. budget. Cameron himself is not a hard Eurosceptic, but his support for a pro-Europe vote in any future referendum has now been made implicitly contingent on his receiving an acceptable offer from his counterparts on the continent. By publicly committing to a referendum, Cameron presents Paris, Berlin and Brussels with the choice of either buying British support for a “yes” vote or hoping that the Conservatives lose the next election. How palatable they’ll find either option remains an open question.

That being said, Brian Taylor points out that the Tories may be undermining their position on the question of Scottish sovereignty:

They have said that the [Scottish National Party] cannot guarantee Scottish membership of the EU, post independence.

The Nationalists have, of course, contested that vigorously but, at the very least, the issue gained some traction.

Now what do the Tories say on this topic?

Reject the SNP, stick with the UK – and we will offer you the prospect that a vote across the whole of these islands may take you out of the EU, perhaps in contradistinction to opinion in Scotland.

In a bid to reassert the economic and political autonomy of Britain, then, the Tories could end up actually weakening the British state.

Whatever the outcome, this episode highlights the contradictory and self-undermining nature of elite responses to the ongoing economic crisis in Europe. Years of austerity, some of it imposed at the encouragement or insistence of Brussels, have made the financial burdens of European integration heavier for the continent’s economic core. At the same time they have constricted recovery and led to anemic growth, high unemployment, and prolonged economic misery.

It would be naive to say that say that such conditions “cause” nationalist or parochial backlash, but the economic crisis does seem to be having centrifugal effects on multiple fronts.

On the one hand, it puts sustained pressure on the political and economic bargains that make the E.U. viable. Though not a member of the Eurozone, Britain is a major net donor to the E.U. (see chart from Le Monde, below) and the third largest economy in Europe. Its departure would represent a major shock to the institution.

EU Contributions; Le Monde

On the other hand, the crisis has intensified sub-national fissures in a number of member states. Separatist and nationalist movements in Scotland, Catalonia and Flanders have all seen their fortunes improve since the onset of the crisis. They present an interesting twist on what Frederick Solt calls “new-nations” theories of economic distress and nationalism (see Brown, Hechter and Brass). In their simplest forms, such theories predict sub-national mobilization by groups that are materially deprived relative to society at large. Relative deprivation is key.  Here, though, nationalist grievances have coalesced around a different narrative. Separatist elites have made hay over the uneven financial burdens imposed by ‘society at large’ on local prosperity. As movements, they seek to protect the fruits of relative affluence rather than overcome relative deprivation.

Recent developments in the U.K. suggest how these super-national and sub-national crises of legitimacy could become mutually reinforcing. The specter of an E.U. exit undermines confidence in the national state’s position as a point of access to European markets and institutions. This in turn raises the stakes of regional separatist politics by sharpening the distinction between national and European alignment.

Cameron may well be able to balance these competing interests for the moment. Acute though the current crisis may be, the institutional roots of both the E.U. and the United Kingdom run deep, and continue to reflect considerable elite and popular consensus. That said, centrifugal pressures across the region seem unlikely to abate until Europe can return to robust and broadly shared growth, something which the broader policies of recent years have done much to forestall.

Election’s Outcome is Huge News for Georgian Democracy

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By Daniel F. Wollrich

On October 1, Georgia held parliamentary elections that were sure to be a victory for President Mikheil Saakashvili’s United National Movement party. Except they weren’t. In fact, challenger Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream coalition—“a group of progressive opposition forces in the Republic of Georgia”—prevailed and will enjoy a parliamentary majority. Even before all the ballots had been counted, President Saakashvili gave his concession speech, overtly accepting the shift in governmental control. The symbolic power of the election and the results’ acceptance by the leadership, however, is far more important and indicates a strong Georgian embrace of democratic governance.

Georgia, a post-Soviet state located in the historically conflict-ridden Caucasus region south of Russia and north of the Middle East, has a short democratic history. With two centuries of explicit Russian dominance (save a few years following the violent collapse of the Russian Empire and during the early consolidation of the Soviet Union), Georgia only reestablished its independence in 1991. While not immediately embracing a democratic institutional framework like the Baltic States, Georgia under Eduard Shevardnadze—former Soviet minister of foreign affairs and Georgian head of state from 1992 to 2003—experienced a mild improvement over the Soviet regime. The country’s politics were marked by stuttering liberalization and weak, often merely symbolic, democratic institutions. Fraud and corruption continued to mar the country’s government, sparking the Rose Revolution following the fraudulent November 2003 parliamentary elections. Shevardnadze was cast out and the Saakashvili era began. This marked the shift to a truly post-Soviet Georgia, establishing enough democratic institutions to earn the title “democracy” from Western observers (even if not a “full democracy”).

Of course, Georgian democracy has been far from flawless. Saakashvili, elected president in 2004 and re-elected in 2008, had seen his popularity wane in the past few years. Accusations of authoritarian rule had sprouted, derived from the strong hand he has played in instituting changes to Georgia’s political landscape. Saakashvili’s most overtly disturbing move, at least internationally, was his attempt to remove his challenger, Ivanishvili, from the political scene by revoking his Georgian citizenship. A law was invoked—driven by Saakashvili—that forbids Georgians from maintaining multiple citizenships. Since Ivanishvili was also a citizen of Russia and France (he has since renounced his Russian citizenship), he was stripped of his status as a Georgian citizen. A constitutional amendment introduced in May, however, may pave the path for a non-Georgian citizen (under certain conditions) to become prime minister. The legal battle remains unresolved, and when—or whether—Ivanishvili can become prime minister is yet to be determined.

More recently, the scandal surrounding abuse in Georgia’s prison system has deeply tainted the carefully cultivated righteous image of Georgian leaders. The torture, taunting, and sexual assault of prisoners sparked angry demonstrations, resulting in the resignation of recently appointed minister of interior Bacho Akhalaia. Moreover, defense minister Dmitri Shashkin was minister of penitentiaries after 2008, indicating the depth—and height—of the scandal in the government. The Georgian regime was struck at its heart, immediately prior to elections, and the evident overstretch of high-level governmental power suggested that Georgian authorities might reveal themselves unwilling to play by rules of fairness and democracy, should they lose the popular vote.

Yet, a warmer light shined upon Georgia’s future this month. The election’s winner was the democratic process. When Saakashvili conceded in spite of expectations that his party would prevail, he showed by action what his words had claimed for years: his rule was for bringing democracy to the Georgian people. In 2008, Georgia held what the Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe called the “first genuinely competitive post-independence presidential election,” and this year, the country enjoyed its first democratic change in power.

Predicting where this leads is difficult. One key challenge not yet discussed here concerns Georgian sovereignty over its entire claimed territory and relations with its northern neighbor, Russia. Throughout his rule, one of Saakashvili’s primary goals has been shoring up the country’s autonomy and establishing territorial integrity, noting that he inherited autonomous or semi-autonomous regions in the northwestern Abkhazia, the north-central South Ossetia, and the southwestern Ajaria. Although he quickly and successfully reintegrated Ajaria, stoking optimism for the remaining two breakaway regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia would prove more resistant. These difficulties stemmed in large part from these regions’ mighty benefactor to the north. This territorial problem continues to haunt Tbilisi, with no apparent solution. It will disrupt Georgian efforts at reconciliation with Russia, regardless of Ivanishvili’s desire to warm relations, and it will obfuscate any paths to NATO membership and official alliance with the West.

Domestic problems also trouble Georgia’s immediate political future. Opposition rallies have continued beyond the election and threaten domestic tranquility and the peacefulness of the transition, in spite of Ivanishvili’s calls for their end. In addition, as discussed above, the question of Ivanishvili’s citizenship and whether he can even become prime minister presents a peculiar and unfortunate case of domestic institutional  manipulation interfering with democratic system processes. Regardless of who assumes the role of prime minister, the probability of political wrangling and the possibility of stalemate between the Georgian Dream coalition in parliament and Saakashvili and the United National Movement in the presidency until next year loom threateningly.

Nevertheless, one cannot underestimate the power of commitment to an idea and especially, as in this case, democracy. Although Saakashvili and Georgia’s political future once seemed intimately intertwined, the president’s prompt and willing concession suggests that Georgia’s governing ideology is not Saakashvili-ism but rather democracy and the rule of the people. Going forward, numerous factors must be watched: Will the Georgian Dream be a dream of democratic consolidation? Will the press be open and liberated and will transparency infiltrate the government?  How will the new government relate to the West, Russia, and its other immediate neighbors? Will the dilemma of South Ossetia and Abkhazia prove obstructionist to international integration and domestic stability? These and other questions illustrate the challenges before Georgia’s new government. But the peaceful, legitimately democratic change of power in Kutaisi bodes well. This election is indeed huge news for Georgia’s democratic endeavors.

Editor’s note: Daniel F. Wollrich is a PhD student at the Ohio State University and a guest contributor for the Smoke-Filled Room. 

Dommage for Catalonia: Identity and Economic Crisis

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Since the beginning of the Euro crisis, there has been a substantial amount of analysis, and more than a bit of hand-wringing, over the (arguably counterproductive) resurgence of nationalism among the European Union’s constituent states. Nicholas Sambanis’s New York Times op-ed from a few weeks ago is representative: he suggests that the crisis has refocused the European populace on their parochial national identities at the expense of their (potentially) continental one, and that such socio-psychological (re)orientation is preventing concerted action to solve the problem:

As Europe’s status declines, the already shaky European identity will weaken further and the citizens of the richer European nations will be more likely to identify nationally — as Germans or French — rather than as Europeans. This will increase their reluctance to use their taxes for bailouts of the ethnically different Southern Europeans, especially the culturally distant Greeks; and it will diminish any prospect of fiscal integration that could help save the euro.
The result is a vicious circle: as ethnic identities return, ethnic differences become more pronounced, and all sides fall back on stereotypes and the stigmatization of the adversary through language or actions intended to dehumanize, thereby justifying hostile actions. This is a common pattern in ethnic conflicts around the world, and it is also evident in Europe today.

Indeed, the economic malaise plaguing Europe provides some interesting evidence for the interaction between crises, insecurity, institutions, elite behavior, and political identity. It has certainly provided a clarifying moment for those who argue that European identity is sufficiently well-developed to have coherent political meaning. The importance of identity is difficult to observe when peoples’ various subject positions (religion, regional identity, nationality, etc.) coexist in harmony. It is when identities are brought into conflict—via social unrest, economic crisis, political competition or war—that they become the most salient. Events of recent years have not boded well for the European project, and have arguably reaffirmed the primacy of the nation-state as the locus of mass political allegiance.

Recent days have added another wrinkle to this narrative. Underreported in the American press, September 11th saw a colossal Catalan nationalist rally in Barcelona. Local police reported 1.5 million attendees. To put this into perspective, that’s nearly as many people as live in the city, and more than 20 percent of the total population of Catalonia. September 11th is Catalonia’s “national day,” commemorating the 1714 Siege of Barcelona that, according to the relevant national mythos, marked the end of Catalan independence. The holiday often draws a decent-sized crowd. This week’s demonstration, though, was orders of magnitude larger than usual. Reports indicate that protesters expressed grievances over their homeland’s disproportionate tax burden within the Spanish state, itself cash-strapped as it struggles with a balance-of-payments crisis originating in Brussels and Berlin.

There are a few points to be made here. The first is to reiterate that for European elites who profess such dedication to their continent-wide project of neoliberal cosmopolitan governance, austerity policies have been highly counterproductive. By requiring Europe’s periphery to deflate its way to renewed growth, Brussels (read: Berlin) is imposing scarcity and economic misery on the very populations it seeks to bind into a unified community of fate. Competition for a shrinking resource base is a poor breeding ground for mutual identification and positive fellow-feeling, yet rather than play savior by easing the damage done to places like Catalonia by international capital markets, institutional Europe has only exacerbated their ill effects.

The second is to note that the last few years provide a measure of support for the account of modern nationalism advanced by Karl Polanyi more than a half-century ago. For Polanyi, the overly-intensive identification with volk and fatherland that plagued midcentury Europe had roots in the collapse of the nineteenth century economic order and the incapacity of extant institutions to assert control over the fates of their societies. The renewed intensity of Catalan nationalism suggests that it continues to function as a kind of psycho-social defense mechanism through which people search for communities of fate with the capacity to control their own destinies. Madrid lies at the mercy of international creditors and lacks the institutional capability to address Spanish problems with any kind of decisiveness. In some ways it’s not surprising that the citizens of Catalonia search for other notions of community with the potential to do better.

Russia the Whipping Boy

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Last week, I wrote about how Russian support for Syria has provided the Obama administration with expedient domestic and international cover for their preferred nonintervention policy. Russia expert Dimitri Simes concurred with that sentiment in a recent interview with the Council on Foreign Relations.

At a certain point, Russians may say to themselves that the game is all over in Syria, or at least almost over. They would not want to be the last ones to be committed to this man who is not viewed in Moscow as the same kind of villain he’s viewed as in Washington, but he’s not quite a hero either. At some point they may decide to give up on him and to start looking for bringing about regime change. They’re not quite there yet. Movement in that direction is driven by opposition successes on the ground, not by public pressure from the Obama administration. Also, Russians think the Obama administration is a little hypocritical, because as they have told Washington, [if] it is so committed to removing Assad, they certainly can do it the way it was done in Iraq, the way it was done during the liberation of Kosovo from Serbia, without Security Council blessing. The Russians are saying it would be a mistake, they would criticize it, but they would not resist it militarily, and it would not be a defining issue in the Russian-American relationship. Russian officials believe the Obama administration really does not want to intervene in Syria, but they’re using Russia as a whipping boy, to blame on Russia what the Obama administration does not quite want to do itself.

The part in bold is particularly revealing. It’ll be interesting to see if Russia, ostensibly aware of the political benefits reaped by the Obama administration, continues its current course of action.

(Thanks to Lionel Beehner for passing this along).

For more of his musings on international politics, follow William on Twitter.

Does Russia Provide Obama Political Cover for Syria?

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Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin

Practitioners and foreign policy experts are vehemently debating the intentions behind Russia’s recent campaign to make explicit its support of Syria and the regime of its embattled ruler, Bashar al-Assad. Although it is still unclear what may have motived Russia’s actions, it seems as if they have had an unexpected, beneficial effect for Russia’s ostensible competitor, the United States, and its leader, President Barack Obama. Noninvolvement has quickly emerged as Obama’s preferred policy on Syria, most likely due to the high risks of pursuing an alternate course during an election year. Russia’s commitment to Assad then, no matter how small or seemingly insignificant, comes at the right time: it may very well provide Obama the political cover he needs, both domestically and internationally, to continue his administration’s Syria policy.

Many point to the Libyan intervention as evidence of better, more active policy options vis-à-vis Syria. In this regard, Libya has become a problem of success for the Obama administration. In a little more than six months, the international community, with American leadership “from behind,” deposed the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi and helped effectively end the ongoing civil war. Less than a year later, Libyans voted in their first free elections in decades. While much remains to be done, much has also been accomplished. Unfortunately, or fortunately for the Libyans, Libya owes much of its success to a perfect storm of geopolitical, strategic, economic, and diplomatic conditions. To its credit, the Obama administration has not been eager to try to re-create that complex confluence of conditions or the intervention itself.

For liberals in favor of Libyan intervention, Libya was “Iraq done right.” In this view, several key factors, not present in Iraq, were present in Libya: international consensus, limited ground troop involvement, and the existence of an organic opposition movement foremost among them. Thanks to Russia, Syria resembles Iraq more than Libya on at least one front. International consensus does not and will not exist by virtue of Russia’s membership on the Security Council, even if other members, notably China, changed their stance. Russian anti-air weapons would either necessitate the involvement of significant ground troops or present substantial risks (and likely losses) for any air operation. As such, the United States would be hard pressed to find support among all of its allies, as it did with Libya. Thus, liberal calls for intervention in Syria—premised in large part on the idea that if it worked in Libya, it could work in Syria—hold little sway with voters on the left.

Russian support for the Assad regime also shields Obama from the right. While some Republicans agree with the Obama administration’s caution, others continue to press for increased involvement. In particular, Mitt Romney recently criticized the Obama administration’s approach as a “policy of paralysis.” Obama can easily deflect such attacks, however, by pointing to the undeniable consequences of the Russian commitment to Syria. Russian support would make any intervention a costly endeavor in both blood and treasure. During tough economic times, on the heels of two long and expensive wars, it is difficult for any presidential hopeful to win many votes with such appeals, even among more moderate and conservative citizens.

On the international front, several key American allies have taken progressively more hawkish stances against the Assad regime. As it did with Libya, the United Kingdom has taken the lead among the United States’s European allies in condemning Assad’s actions. While it remains unclear how deeply they want to become involved militarily, British officials have made Syria a key area of concern internationally. While Britain will continue to put forth Security Council resolutions condemning the Assad regime, Russia’s guaranteed veto assures that no resolution will pass. Thus, because of the Russian Security Council veto, the United States can safely support any UN resolution against Syria, saving face both with the international community as well as with a key ally.

More critical, of course, is the increasingly toxic dispute between Turkey and Syria, highlighted by Syria’s shooting down of a Turkish reconnaissance plane last month. In response to the incident, Turkey invoked Article IV of the NATO charter, necessitating an emergency meeting of NATO leaders. This put Turkey’s allies, particularly the United States, in an awkward position. However, Obama administration officials can utilize Russian support to frame military involvement as an undesirable option for Turkey. After all, Syria most likely used Russian weapons to shoot down the Turkish plane.

By all accounts, the Obama administration remains earnest in its disapproval of the Assad regime. Moreover, political cover notwithstanding, Russia’s commitment to Syria does make noninvolvement the most prudent policy. That being said, thanks to this aforementioned cover, Russian policy on Syria, intentions aside, has become highly beneficial for the Obama administration.

For more of his musings on politics, follow William on Twitter.

Eight Observations from the Greek Election (Part 2)

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The Euro Strikes Back!

The Euro Strikes Back!

I devoted the first part of this post (the first four observations) to a discussion of the election results. In this second part, I explore the consequences of the electoral results. The immediate outcome was, of course, the formation of a pro-Euro coalition government between plurality winning center-right New Democracy and two center-left parties, Pasok and the Democratic Left. But what will this mean for Greece, Europe, and the global economy moving forward? On the eve of Antonis Samaras officially taking the reigns as Prime Minister and the “Troika” (the International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank, and the European Union) visiting Greece to assess its financial progress, I thought it would be appropriate to take a second post-election pulse of the nation.

5.) Greeks accept the euro but reject the terms of the bailout

Despite the electoral defeat of Alexis Tsipras’s anti-bailout Syriza party, the pervasiveness of anti-bailout sentiment in Greece is manifest. Over half the votes from the June 17th elections went to parties opposed wholesale to the terms of the 130 billion euro bailout. Greek and European leaders took notice. Although medical ailments prevented him from personally attending the EU summit in Brussels last week, new Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras sent a letter to European leaders asking for revised terms to the bailout. The letter was short on detail but contained guarantees that Greece would work hard at political reforms.

As the Troika descends upon Athens once again, it appears that the letter previewed a larger effort by the coalition government to negotiate more lenient terms. The current terms have made successive receipt of rescue funds contingent on Greece meeting a set of “fiscal targets” and enacting a series of austerity cuts, making this  deal wildly unpopular in Greece. While the government still hopes to meet the fiscal targets set by the Troika, they are expected to ask for greater leeway in the means by which they will meet them. That is, less forced austerity. Seeing as the current “austerity for growth” program has the Greek economy contracting a projected 6.7% in 2012, the Greeks may have a point.

At first, it appeared that Germany Europe would remain steadfast in its refusal to alter the terms of the original bailout. However, pressure from Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy and Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti for a new approach to dealing with the Eurozone crisis has left Greek observers hopeful that some terms may be renegotiated.  In the words of Deputy Finance Minister Christos Staikouras before meeting with the Troika,

The climate is becoming more favorable to changes and adjustments provided we meet our commitments and work towards implementing targets.

We will soon find out if he is right or not.

6.) International organizations affect domestic politics and domestic politics affect international organizations

In November 2011, then Prime Minister George Papandreou, of Pasok, proposed holding a public referendum on the newly renegotiated debt deal. As the June 17th elections showed, such a referendum would likely have failed. Sensing this outcome, European leaders summoned Papandreou to Cannes where he was “reproached” before an upcoming G-20 meeting.  Papandreou returned to Athens and promptly cancelled the referendum. Within weeks, his government had collapsed. Within months, his party had been reduced to its lowest vote share in decades. The impact of EU leaders on the Greek polity seem shocking, even months later. Not only did these international actors “convince” Papandreou to change domestic policy but they also effectively ended his premiership.

The aftermath of the June 17th election have demonstrated that the causal arrow can run in the other direction as well. As detailed above, the success of anti-bailout parties like Syriza has forced the Samaras government and, by extension, the European Union to rethink their approach to the bailout deal. The results of the upcoming negotiations of the terms may even shape how the EU deals with future states asking for aid. Finally, as I discuss below, these electoral results may even lead to structural change in the European Union itself.

7.) The EU finally suffers from its democratic deficit

For decades, the European Union has suffered from what critics have called a “democratic deficit.” With a few exceptions, EU integration has progressed without the approval of domestic majorities. However, up until very recently, the problems with the democratic deficit have been primarily theoretical.  To use a famous example, after the Dutch and French rejected the European Constitution, most of it was repackaged as the Treaty of Lisbon and approved in both countries.

This approach has more or less worked because the EU has provided member states with a plethora of tangible and intangible benefits without asking for much in return. Although states would lose national sovereignty, the loss was rarely so great that it would become objectionable to democratic majorities. Then came the euro.

The euro represented the greatest single sacrifice of national sovereignty in the history of the EU. However, it also held great promise, again, both in tangible and intangible ways, for the member states. In many ways, it reflected the “high risk, high reward” mindset endemic to the 1990s and early 2000s. Although domestic opposition was more pronounced, majorities either favored or began to favor the adoption of the euro, as they had with past measures of EU integration.

In 2012, however, the euro is in crisis. And, as these Greek elections show, support for the euro in individual member states is dropping. For Europeans, the only way to save the euro may be to proceed even further with EU integration. In this past week’s EU summit, European leaders agreed to permit the direct transfer of rescue funds to domestic banks from the ECB’s central bailout fund in exchange for direct supervision of the banks by the ECB. The deal essentially eliminates member state governments as the middlemen. Moreover, European leaders are discussing similar agreements that would establish debt pooling and Eurobonds (sold on the basis of German credit) in exchange for further central supervision of member state finances. In brief, European leaders have recognized that the only way to save the Eurozone, counter-intuitively, may be deeper fiscal integration.

However, European publics take erosion of national sovereignty quite seriously. In the past, they have been willing to accept it because of its gradual nature. However, the current Eurozone crisis requires swift action that may force European governments into deeper integration. While the anti-bailout parties were defeated in this election in Greece, a push for deeper integration with the EU by the Samaras government may spur a backlash that ultimately brings to power anti-EU parties. In this regard, Greece could be the harbinger for the idea that for the first time, the EU may finally suffer the consequences of its democratic deficit.

8.) The coalition government does not inspire confidence

The coalition government, meant at first to be a unity government of all major parties, is a coalition in name only. For all intents and purposes, it is a New Democracy government. Syriza refused to partake in the government altogether, preferring to be in opposition. New Democracy’s coalition partners, Pasok and the Democratic Left, refused to take cabinet positions. Syriza’s motivations are clear: they oppose the bailout wholesale and will not be minority partners in any coalition that accedes to the bailout terms. The motivations of the leftist coalition partners are less clear. It appears, however, that after failed negotiations for high cabinet positions, these parties are merely insulating themselves from the inevitable political damage that comes from enacting austerity protocols.

In an interview with the Guardian immediately following the elections, Dimitris Keridis, professor of political science at Panteion University in Athens said that

The secret to this government surviving will be trust among the three partners. If they fragment, the only beneficiary will be Syriza. It won’t be easy in a political culture that is, anyway, not used to coalitions and in a country that faces such tough decisions.

Almost on cue, the leftist parties refused cabinet positions and proceeded to distance themselves from the coalition government. While such behavior befits Syriza, an opposition party, it is befuddling from New Democracy’s coalition partners. Indeed, these developments do not bode well for the success of the coalition government. At any point, it seems, New Democracy could lose the parliamentary majority it possess thanks to the coalition. This will make tough political reforms very difficult to enact. New Democracy, fearing backlash, will be reticent to push for policies that would make it easy for their coalition partners to abandon them. Unfortunately, many of those policies might be the ones necessary to reform Greece and spur economic growth.

For more of his musings on politics, follow William on Twitter.

What If Greece Kicked Germany Out of the Euro?

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July 4th, 2004. Syntagma Square, Athens, Greece.

Syntagma Square following the Euro 2004 victory.

It’s a happy time for Greece. The 2004 Athens Olympics are barely a month away. Helena Paparizou is mere months away from assuring all Europeans that they are her secret passion and that she has no other. Few people know about Greece’s heavy borrowing and growing deficit.

Indeed, on this warm, perfect Sunday, thousands of Greeks have gathered in central Syntagma Square not to protest, but to rejoice. Greece, defying 80-1 odds, have won the 2004 Euro Cup. Greeks, a younger version of myself included, have gathered to sing, dance, wear an inappropriately little amount of clothing, and, above all else, celebrate. Dora Bakoyannis, the much-celebrated mayor of Athens and future national New Democracy politician, encapsulates the feelings of all Greeks when she says,

this is a unique moment for all of Greece, it is indescribable

Indeed, indescribable. Try as I might, it is difficult to describe the feelings of that celebration without just using the words “unadulterated national joy” over and over again. There is something about that moment that all Greeks will remember: times were good and the soccer was even better. After all, as Bakoyannis said, this was a “unique moment.” For a country whose inhabitants believe that it invented math, democracy, and everything in between, this is quite the statement.

Perhaps the best analogue for the Greek sentiment following the 2004 Euro Cup is the 1986 Argentinian World Cup victory. Although the Argentinians, unlike the Greeks, were not underdogs, the similarities are striking, right down to the future inevitable but still unexpected financial crisis. The 1986 World Cup victory was highlighted by a 2-1 victory over England in the quarterfinal, only a few years after the Falklands War. The much-celebrated victory boosted Argentinian national consciousness to its highest peaks in the post-Falklands era.

During the financial crisis of the late 1990s and early 2000s and the tough times that followed, the soccer gods offered the Argentine nation a reprieve: a chance to beat England at the 2002 World Cup, reliving the glory of 1986 and making the hardship ahead a little bit easier to bear. Argentina lost 1-0. The result was, for obvious reasons, devastating to a nation looking to their soccer team for confidence at a time when their economy and politicians inspired none.

Later this afternoon (2:45 EST), Greece is playing Germany in the 2012 Euro Cup. For Germany, the match is an important test for an untested and new generation of players. For Greece, it is a David-versus-Goliath struggle for national pride against an opponent from a country whose leaders many Greeks feel embarrass them on a daily basis. One of these leaders, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, will be in attendance.

For months, Greeks have searched for something, anything to give them hope as a nation in these troubling times. As the success of the far left Syriza and their invigorating young leader, Alexis Tsipras, suggests, Greeks are desperate for any shred of hope tossed their way. More tough times lie ahead for Greece. Even though it may not affect the actual policies, the mere national psychological benefit of a victory may be the Greek brandy to the German austerity medicine. A victory would remind Greeks of a time in which they were at their happiest and their most integrated with Europe—2004. The benefit of such a victory (and the damage of such a loss) for the psychological health of a country undergoing drastic socio-economic changes and tough political reforms can hardly be overstated. Just ask Argentina.

Update: Greece lost 4-2 to Germany. William can be found drowning his sorrows in tubs of moussaka…or on Twitter.

When Abortion Leads to the Decline of Nations

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Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Across the Atlantic from the abortion debates in Arizona, Virginia, Philadelphia, and most recently, Michigan, a very similar discussion can be found in Turkey. A few weeks ago, Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said that he considered abortion to be murder. The statement was strongly endorsed by the head of the Parliament’s Human Rights Commission and the Family and Social Policies Minister – both women.

However, unlike their fellow conservatives stateside, this debate is ostensibly not just based on pro-life or religious reasons. According to Erdoğan, keeping abortion legal is “a sly plan to wipe this nation off the global stage.” Such statements are not all that surprising, given that last year Erdoğan expressed concern about a declining Turkish population. He went on to urge Turkish families to have at least three kids, claiming that those who did would receive a ‘prize’.

Though a majority of Turkish citizens are in opposition to a draft bill which would make abortion illegal (abortion is currently legal in Turkey during the first 10 weeks of the pregnancy), the nature of the debate highlights two rather disturbing trends. First, it points to the over-extension of the state into highly private matters. The ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party) has tried to adopt similar extensions into people’s private lives in the past – in 2004, they tried to criminalize adultery, but the proposal was dropped in the face of criticism both from within Turkey and from Europe.

Secondly, and more alarmingly, it showcases a nationalistic fear – of being wiped off the map and of diluting ‘Turkish-ness’. Such an understanding also naturally lends itself to giving no room for the assimilation of minorities or immigrants. In fact, some analysts have argued this decision may have political rather than religious motives behind it as it aims to counter the high birth rates among the Kurdish population of the country. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute, in Southeast Anatolia and Central Anatolia, where a majority of the Kurdish population in Turkey resides, the birth rate is 27.3 per 1000 people and 22.9 per 1000 people respectively. This is much higher than the rest of the regions where most of the population is ethnically Turkish, and birth rates are below 19 per 1,000 people, with as low as 11 per 1,000 in some parts of the country (numbers reflect data from August 2011).

A counter-argument might be that the higher birthrates among the Kurds are just caused by a lack of basic services – such as education, provision of health service and birth control, and should therefore, not be linked to some sort of conspiracy by the Kurds to outnumber the Turks. Some have even claimed that the debate over abortion was started by the Prime Minister just to divert the public’s attention from the Uludere incident – where 34 civilians near the Iraqi border were killed in a strike by the Turkish military. However, some analysts have commented that organizations can use ‘ethnic reproduction’ as political tools to reach their goals. Indeed, after looking at Erdoğan’s past statements and his concern about a declining Turkish population, one cannot say with so much certainty that the debate on abortion was initiated just to divert the public’s attention.

While controversial policies geared toward ethnic minorities are nothing new for Turkey, using social policy in this manner is. Moreover, Turkish women’s groups now have to focus on getting the state to offer better alternatives to rape victims, and those women, who out of fear of giving birth to another female child in a highly patriarchal society, will take recourse to illegal and more dangerous options to terminate their girl child. In the longer term however, one must cautiously watch the nature of AKP’s policies, and how they might have troubling consequences for the mindset of Turkish society.

Eight Observations from the Greek Elections (Part 1)

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Electoral Map of Greece from the June 17th Elections

Source: Greek Ministry of the Interior

After the May 6th elections did not produce a majority government, Greece held new elections yesterday. Center-right New Democracy emerged as the victor, with almost 29% of the vote. The far left coalition, Syriza, which had pledged to reject the terms of the European bailout package, finished a strong second with almost 27%. As we wait for New Democracy to attempt to form a government (it could take a while), I offer a set of observations from the initial results.

1.)    Institutions matter!

Few topics and arguments get as hammered into the brains of comparative politics students as the importance of political institutions. From ethnic cooperation to economic policymaking, institutions are assumed to play a big role in politics. The electoral rule that awards fifty extra seats to the first-place party has played an important part in the Greek elections. This is a new feature of the system, implemented for the first time during the May elections (before, the award was merely forty seats) and designed to make forming governments easier for the plurality vote-getting party.

These fifty seats (151 provides the majority necessary to form a government) have more or less ensured that a new government will include New Democracy. It is perhaps unsurprising then that, as part of its platform, Syriza demanded a purely proportional system. While the presence of this rule makes crafting a government easier from a purely logistical sense, it may also inhibit some other coalitions. Given the apparent willingness of the center-left party, Pasok, to cooperate with Syriza, albeit only in a unity government, one wonders whether a Syriza-Pasok coalition government would not have been a possible, if not logical, outcome were the fifty seat rule not in a place. At the very least, the possibility of such a government would have given Pasok (or Syriza) additional leverage over New Democracy.

As amusing as these hypothetical scenarios may be, they do omit a critical additional benefit of the fifty seat rule: it makes governance possible. As a New Democracy-Pasok-Democratic Left pro-Euro coalition starts looking more likely, it will be critical for these parties to have enough political capital in parliament to enact what will likely be a set of tough reforms. The fifty seats awarded to such a coalition will make enacting those reforms much easier. Although the aforementioned coalition government would still only retain 179 out of 300 seats, the presence of the fifty seat rule ensures a much more stable coalition than would otherwise have been possible.

2.)    Political entrepreneurs: Antonis Samaras and Alexis Tsipras

Robert Dahl, whose works Yale political science graduate students are required to cite and name intramural sports teams after, introduced the concept of a “political entrepreneur” in his book Who Governs? The political entrepreneur is an especially crafty politician who uses his abilities to rally popular support behind him. In a democracy, the possibilities for such a person are limitless. As Dahl puts it:

Political resources can be pyramided in much the same way that a man who starts out in business sometimes pyramids a small investment into a corporate empire. To the political entrepreneur who has skill and drive, the political system offers unusual opportunities for pyramiding a small amount of initial resources into a sizable political holding.

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