The Quest to Rule Egypt, Plus Sinai

It’s been an eventful month so far in Egypt, to put it mildly. On the heels of rising instability and fatal violence in North Sinai pitting militants against both the Egyptian and Israeli states, on Sunday President Mohamed Morsy announced significant changes to both the leadership of the armed forces and the structure of the political system.

Clashes in the north of Sinai are nothing new, but the attack on August 5 — an operation that resulted in the deaths of 16 Egyptian border guards, as well as the theft of vehicles then used to penetrate Israel — was shocking in both its magnitude and audacity. (See The Arabist for Issandr El Amrani’s exceedingly useful summary of the initial attack in Sinai, posted August 6.) The area has since seen additional violence, including Egyptian airstrikes that` reportedly killed 20, and further armed clashes initiated by both militants and Egyptian armed forces.

As the situation in North Sinai has continued to boil over, the jockeying over power at the national level doesn’t seem to have skipped a beat. President Morsy (who captured the presidency as the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, although since his election victory he has formally left the organization and its political party) recently moved to assert his authority in a two-pronged maneuver, as laid out in an August 12 article in The New York Times:

President Mohamed Morsi of Egypt forced the retirement on Sunday of his powerful defense minister, the army chief of staff and other senior generals, moving more aggressively than ever before to reclaim political power that the military had seized since the fall of Hosni Mubarak last year.

Mr. Morsi also nullified a constitutional declaration, issued by the military before he took office on June 30, that had gutted the authority of his office. On Sunday, he replaced it with his own declaration, one that gave him broad legislative and executive powers and, potentially, a decisive role in the drafting of Egypt’s still unfinished new constitution.

This came after a different shakeup earlier this month in direct response to the attacks in Sinai. As for what this all means, there isn’t exactly consensus. The August 12 NYT story following the more recent personnel changes noted:

For his new defense minister, Mr. Morsi chose the head of military intelligence, Gen. Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi, who was seen as close to Field Marshal Tantawi… Gen. Mohamed al-Assar, a member of the military council, was named an assistant defense minister. He told Reuters that Mr. Morsi’s decision was “based on consultation with the field marshal and the rest of the military council.”

While the retirements marked at least a symbolic end to the military’s dominant role in Egyptian politics, Mr. Morsi’s abolishment of the constitutional declaration posed a more fundamental challenge to the military. It also raised the possibility of a new confrontation with one of Egypt’s highest courts.

After offering a caveat regarding the preliminary nature of his impressions, El Amrani presented his initial perspective on the moves in a Sunday post. In the piece, he breaks down Morsy’s decisions into two categories, dealing first with the military personnel changes:

The overall impression I get is of a change of personalities with continuity in the institution. More junior officers are taking the posts of their former superiors, and some SCAF members are shifting positions. The departure of Tantawi was inevitable considering his age and unpopularity…

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The Junta and the Brothers

Egypt’s democratic future is bright! Except, of course, that it probably isn’t — at least in the near term. The process of ‘transitioning to democracy’ under the stewardship of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has largely been a sham, a long con carried out by the junta as it has sought to preserve military power and privilege.

The end of last month brought a symbolic — albeit uninspiring — milestone in this process, with the armed forces making a show of formally transferring power to the recently-elected civilian president:

Egypt’s new President Mohamed Mursi said on [June 30] the military that took charge when Hosni Mubarak was overthrown last year had kept its promise to hand over power, speaking at a ceremony to mark the formal transfer of authority.

This ceremony capped a month of rapid political developments, against a backdrop of apparent confrontation between the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the generals, interspersed with conciliation. Highlights from June — which I was fortunate to be able to spend in Egypt — include swirling rumors about Mubarak (ismubarakdead.com); the invalidation of parliament; naked power grabbing by SCAF through a constitutional declaration; and the presidential run-off round, accompanied by Egypt’s collective holding of breath as the announcement of results was delayed.

Fun times with the Brothers and the junta have continued into July. Juan Cole noted last week:

Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi tried to steal third base on [July 8], announcing that he was calling back into session the dissolved Egyptian parliament. It would continue to meet, he said, until new parliamentary elections, to be held within 60 days of the completion of the new constitution. He thus took on both the Supreme Court and the officer corps, setting the stage for a face-off.

Apparently cute photo ops aren’t everything (check out the hyperlink embedded in the selection from Cole, above); the military and the oh-so-impartial judiciary wasted little time before hitting back, a New York Times article explained:

Egypt’s highest court and its most senior generals on Monday [July 9] dismissed President Mohamed Morsi’s order to restore the dissolved Parliament as an affront to the rule of law, escalating a raw contest for supremacy between the competing camps… [A]t its core, the fate of this Parliament is another chapter in the long-running battle between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military[.]

(For particulars of parliament being dissolved, see this Arabist post, including Tamir Moustafa’s comment at the bottom of the page.) The result? “Not so defiant: Egypt’s parliament meets for 5 minutes” — followed shortly after by Morsy seemingly backing down, at least for a moment. The matter is currently in the hands of an administrative court, and decisions on this and other critical issues are slated for today, July 19.

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Morsy wins! Morsy wins! (But now what?)

Following the rapid developments in Egypt’s political scene over recent weeks has been enough to give any interested observer an anxiety attack – or a splitting headache, at the least. At any given moment, it’s hard to know whether to be optimistic or pessimistic about the country’s future, or even what exactly is going on. And now, with Egypt’s ‘transition to democracy’ appearing to be in its denouement, things don’t seem likely to slow down anytime soon. Although the ruling junta is slated to transfer power to civilians at the end of the month, it remains to be seen how much control they will actually relinquish in practice.

After days of suspense and delay – and heightened contention between the ruling military and the Muslim Brotherhood – yesterday saw the official announcement of the results from the run-off portion of the country’s first post-uprising presidential election. Voting in this round took place just over a week ago, on June 16 and 17, and Egyptians were forced to wait to hear whether their next president would be Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsy, or Ahmed Shafiq, who is associated with the former regime.

After the declaration of Morsy’s victory yesterday, many Egyptians took to the street in what appeared to be a spontaneous eruption of happiness with the result. There seems to be good reason for this outpouring of joy. As a Sunday post by Issandr El Amrani at The Arabist argued:

The celebration in Tahrir and elsewhere shows many Egyptians are delighted at the news, or at least for some at Ahmed Shafiq’s defeat. They are right to be enthusiastic: a Shafiq victory would have been a disaster for most Egyptians, a signal for the resurrection of the police state, and considering that the victory would have been considered stolen by many, probably the cause of much bloodshed

But despite the completion of the presidential contest, and the clear significance of Morsy’s victory, a great deal of uncertainty remains – not only about the country’s path going forward, but also over what exactly transpired in recent days. El Amrani argues:

[W]hat of a Morsi victory? At the symbolic level, it is important: Morsi is the first democratically elected Islamist president of the Arab world, and also Egypt’s first civilian president. His victory signals the defeat, for now, of the felool ['remnants'] and the patronage networks of the Mubarak regime. In more practical terms, things are more hazy… So many questions remain unanswered that what can best be said is that either SCAF and the Brotherhood have worked out a deal of some sort or the political jousting has only just begun.

As the post points out, numerous issues about the framework for going forward remain unresolved, including the scope of presidential power. Indeed, there still appears to be disagreement over a number of issues such as the now-dissolved parliament that was seated earlier this year, as well as the process for choosing an assembly to craft a new constitution.

The lack of clarity seems almost comic, and would be amusing if it weren’t so dangerous. Marc Lynch provides a very clever assessment of the current off-the-cuff nature of the transition in a June 18 post, “Calvinball in Cairo:”

The best guide to the chaos of Egyptian politics is Hobbes.  No, not Thomas Hobbes — Calvin and Hobbes… [O]ver the last week it’s become clear that Egyptians are in fact caught up in one great game of Calvinball. For those who don’t remember Bill Watterson’s game theory masterpiece, Calvinball is a game defined by the absence of rules — or, rather, that the rules are made up as they go along.. As in Calvinball, the one constant in Cairo’s trainwreck of a transition seems to be the constantly changing rules and absolute institutional uncertainty.

Yet, as Lynch points out, this situation doesn’t mean inevitable triumph for the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, or SCAF, the military junta that currently controls the country:

But here’s the thing — Calvin doesn’t always win at Calvinball.  Players succeed by responding quickly and creatively to the constantly changing conditions…Watterson’s game theoretic analysis suggests that Calvinball’s absence of rules does not automatically bestow victory on Calvin.  The game is going to continue for a long time, at least until the players finally settle on some more stable rules which command general legitimacy.  Perhaps the SCAF might not automatically dominate SCAFball?

How effectively Morsy can play a role in shaping the process is still an open question, as is whether the military will actively work to undercut him moving forward. One thing is definitely clear:  his job will not be a simple one, as a Sunday New York Times article explained:

As the first freely elected president of Egypt, Mr. Morsi has a historic opportunity, but he faces a litany of challenges that could prevent him from becoming more than just a figurehead. He will have to spar with the generals, who, just after the election, stripped much of the power from the presidency, and he must overcome the doubts of those who chose his opponent — nearly half of the voters — and millions more who did not vote. Mr. Morsi will also have to convince Egyptians that he represents more than just the narrow interests of the Muslim Brotherhood and to soothe fears among many that his true goal is to bind the notion of citizenship itself more closely to Islam.. He resigned from the group on Sunday, but many people believe his years in the organization mean his ties to it will persist.

Under the assumption that the military and Brotherhood are still jockeying for position, not just playing out the string following some secret agreement, Morsy’s victory seems to be a clear gain for latter. As El Amrani pointed out, yesterday “marks the first time in the last few months that the Brothers have played chicken with SCAF and won.” Whether or not the military will yield in other areas, however, is unclear. The next stage of the struggle is shaping up already, and it appears that it will include a strong focus on the legislative branch, as the Times article on difficulties facing Morsy spells out:

Mr. Morsi’s first test will come immediately. Brotherhood leaders have said that thousands of their supporters will continue to occupy Tahrir Square until the Parliament, which the military council dissolved last week, is reinstated. The military rulers have said that elections will be held for a new Parliament, although those ousted were seated in January. On Sunday, Mr. Morsi threw down his first challenge to the military, saying he would be sworn in only in front of the Parliament whose members were just dismissed.

So the next round of SCAFball is on. With no firm rules governing play, people here in Egypt and around the world will have to wait to see not just how it turns out — but also how the game itself is played.

A Coup by Any Other Name… is Still a Coup

The January 25, 2011 uprising against Hosni Mubarak ushered in a period of great hope for Egypt. Now, a year and a half later, the promise of the Egyptian revolution is almost completely snuffed out – and the military, once hailed as the savior of the revolution, is the one firmly holding the pillow over its head.

Superficially, at least, Egyptians may appear to be reaping the fruits of their rebellion. The past two days have seen the completion of a runoff round of presidential elections, following the first round of voting last month. On Monday morning, although the results had yet to be officially announced, the outcome appeared relatively certain:

An election committee source told Reuters that Islamist Mohamed Morsy, a U.S.-educated engineer, was comfortably ahead of former air force general Ahmed Shafik with most of the votes tallied. But the count, which would make him the first civilian leader in 60 years, had yet to be officially finalized.

But this accomplishment belies the reality of the situation. The parliament elected in the wake of the January 25 uprising was disbanded last week by a judiciary that few, if any, see as impartial. And during the runoff round of the presidential election, voters were presented with the somewhat unpopular choice between Shafik (Mubarak’s last prime minister and a figure associated with the previous regime) and Morsy (the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, derided as a ‘spare tire’ after being selected to replace the group’s initial choice, who was disqualified earlier this year).

Even more depressing is the fact that the military still holds all the cards that count, and they’re getting less and less shy about playing them. Indeed, it seems that Morsy’s anticipated victory in the presidential election may not actually mean much, as the junta has acted to enshrine its influence moving forward. If there was any remaining uncertainty as to the true intentions of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), its most recent move should remove this lingering ambiguity:

Just after the polls closed, the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces issued a constitutional declaration, granting itself legislative powers, control over the economy and the right to pick who will draft the next constitution.

With no constitution in place and parliament technically invalidated, the real question is whether the Brotherhood will be content for now with Morsy’s victory, or whether they will challenge the military’s dominance moving forward – and if they decide to take on the military, what route they choose. And just as importantly, if Brotherhood members and supporters do take to the street to challenge the junta, it remains to be seen how many others will join them.

The situation here in Egypt is both fluid and immensely worrying. I’ll be posting updates from Egypt moving forward.